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The Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) plays an exceptional role in
the modern nuclear engineering, especially in detection of hazardous sub-
stances. However, in the aquatic environment, there are still many prob-
lems to be solved for effective usage of this technique. We present status
of SABAT (Stoichiometry Analysis By Activation Techniques), one of the
projects aiming at construction of an underwater device for non-invasive
threat detection based on the NAA.
PACS numbers: P82.80.Jp, 89.20.Dd
1. Introduction
In twenty-first century the risk of terrorists attack is constantly growing
around the world. This situation put us in a need to develop more effec-
tive methods to detect potential threats and smuggling of illicit materials,
e.g. explosives or drugs. New methods are needed particularly for shores
and ports protection and monitoring. They are very important also in view
of environmental protection of sea areas of intensive warfare, e.g. Baltic
Sea [1, 2]. Over 250 kilotons of munition were sunk into Baltic Sea, mostly
explosives, but also many chemical agents. It was estimated that if only
16 % of the sunken ammunition was released into the Baltic the life in the
sea and at its shores would be entirely ruined for the next 100 years [3].
Precise knowledge of location and amount of these hazardous substances is
crucial for a proper planning to deal with such ecological bomb.
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The presently used methods of detection are based on sonars followed by
divers inspection, which is not effective and rather expensive and puts the
divers into danger due to unknown composition of the suspected items found
by the sonar. One of the methods which has a big potential to substitute
or support sonars is the Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA). It is based
on fast or thermal neutron beams which excite nuclei of investigated sub-
stance. Detection of characteristic gamma quanta emitted in de-excitation
of the nuclei allows one to identify the stoichiometry of the substance and
determine if it is dangerous [4, 5]. There are several designed and pro-
duced devices utilizing the NAA for detecting dangerous substances on the
ground [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], but in the water one needs to overcome many diffi-
culties connected to neutron attenuation and huge background from oxygen
and hydrogen. This background can be reduced for example by using neu-
tron generators with associated α particle measurement and by decreasing
the distance between the inspected object and the detector [1]. There are
also solutions based on low energy neutrons which are moderated in water
before reaching the tested object. The detector is then registering gamma
quanta originating from thermal neutron capture [3].
In this articles we present status of the design of a NAA-based device within
the SABAT project, where we use guides for the neutron beam and gamma
quanta emitted towards the detector. This method not only reduces the
background from water but also may provide detection of dangerous sub-
stances hidden deep in the bottom of the sea and may allow determination
of the density distribution of the dangerous substance in the tested object.
Detailed description of the project can be found in [11] and [12].
2. Preliminary MCNP simulations of the SABAT detection
system
To design and optimize the SABAT detector in terms of high sensitivity
and interrogation time we have performed Monte Carlo simulations using
the general Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code (MCNP) package [13].
We studied geometry of the system including the relative positions of gamma
quanta detector and the neutron generator, and the optimal guides dimen-
sions. Moreover, one needs to determine the optimal material composition
of the whole device. The simulated setup is shown in Fig. 1. An subma-
rine (blue rectangle) is positioned above the seabed (in yellow) inside which
there is an container with hazardous material. The gamma quanta detec-
tor and neutron source (generator) are placed inside the submarine and are
connected to guides filled with air. Since we optimize the sensor for the
detection of war remnants, in particular chemical agents, we assume that
the simulated shell contains mustard gas (C4H8Cl2S). The generator emits
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Fig. 1. Exemplary scheme of the simulated SABAT sensor geometry. An submarine
(blue rectangle) with dimensions 300 x 300 x 200 cm3 contains the neutron source
(yellow dot) and gamma quanta detector (red). The neutron and γ quanta guides
(also in blue) are simulated as 20 x 20 x 10 cm3 cuboid and 26 cm long polyhedron
with 20 x 7.56 cm2 and 16.7 x 20 cm2 bases, respectively. An container with
mustard gas with dimensions 194 x 50 x 50 cm3 (in green) is placed inside the
bottom of the sea represented by yellow rectangle (400 x 400 x 151.5 cm3). Both
the submarine and guides are filled with air under normal pressure.
neutrons isotropically and only a small fraction which travels inside the
neutron guide reaches the interrogated item without any interaction. These
neutrons may activate the mustard gas via inelastic scattering or neutron
capture which results in emission of the characteristic gamma quanta which
are eventually registered by the detector. It is usually a semiconductor
detector, e.g. silicon or HPGe (High Purity Germanium), since it is char-
acterized by very good energy resolution and detection efficiency. On the
other hand, they need a cooling system which limits mobility of the whole
device. Moreover, HPGe detectors are known to be sensitive to neutron
flux, which results in a degradation of the energy resolution over time. As
an alternative material one usually uses scintillators. Among many com-
mercially available scintillator materials we have considered so far BGO,
NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce). BGO is more efficient than the other two materi-
als due to high density, but it has worst energy resolution [14]. The best
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choice, according to Refs. [14, 15], is the LaBr3(Ce) with a good energy
and time resolutions and providing detection efficiency close to the one of
HPGe detectors. Exemplary energy spectra of the activated mustard gas
obtained with 108 generated neutrons and assuming the gamma quanta de-
tector made out of NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) are shown in Fig. 2 a) and b),
respectively.In the simulations we assumed that the neutron generator works
in continuous beam mode. As expected for both distributions we observe
huge background with oxygen peaks around 5-6.5 MeV. The sulfur line at
2.12 MeV is completely covered by very close hydrogen peak. Similarly, the
4.4 MeV line of carbon is overwhelmed by the background, mostly by the
4.5 MeV characteristic γ quanta of silicon [16, 17]. We see instead small
peaks from chlorine at 0.79, 1.16, 1.94 MeV, 7.42, 7.80 and 8.58 MeV. As
one can see the NaI(Tl) detector does not provide a clear C peak and the
Chorine lines are much more smeared. The simulations indicate that the
performance of this detector could be improved by increasing its size but
the identification of potential threats will be anyway much more difficult
than in the case of LaBr3(Ce). To decrease the background from water
we introduced a 5 cm thick led shield around the gamma quanta detector,
leaving open only the face connected to the γ quanta guide. Unfortunately
we did not see any improvement in the sensitivity of the simulated sensor.
The performed simulations allowed us also to analyze time structure of the
activation processes during the interrogation of the suspected object. In
general there are two gamma quanta groups contributing to the energy dis-
tributions measured by the detector. First group consists of the prompt
gammas hitting the detector within tens of nanoseconds after the neutron
emission, depending on the distances between the activated object, neu-
tron source and the detector. These gamma quanta originate mostly from
the nucleus excitation by the inelastic scattering. The other group of gam-
mas is registered much later and comes from the thermal neutron capture.
The 14.1 MeV neutrons need to be moderated before they can be captured
which takes relatively long time. Fig. 3 a) shows the energy spectra of
gamma quanta registered by the detector in the 50 ns time window after
the neutron emission for the mustard gas and background. Surprisingly one
can observe noise reduction in the energy region of the sulfur peak. More-
over, it turns out that our detection system is even sensitive to another Cl
line in this energy range. The 4.4 MeV line of carbon is unfortunately again
merged with Si line. Chlorine is visible also for delayed γ quanta shown
in Fig. 3 b) which were registered 2 µs after neutron emission. This time
window provides excellent selectivity of many Cl lines (1.16, 7.42, 7.80 and
8.58 MeV).
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Fig. 2. Energy distributions simulated assuming the γ quanta detector made from
a) 3”x3” NaI(Tl) and b) 3”x3” LaBr3(Ce). The black curve represents simulations
with mustard gas container while in red we present background simulation when
the gas is replaced by sand.
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Fig. 3. Energy distributions simulated assuming the γ quantum registration time
a) within 50 ns after neutron emission and b) bigger than 2 µs after neutron
emission. The detector is simulated as 3”x3” LaBr3(Ce) scintillator. The black
curve represents simulations with mustard gas container while in red we present
background simulation when the gas is replaced by sand.
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3. Conclusions and outlook
We have been developing a new system for underwater threats detection
based on the Neutron Activation Analysis. This device has been optimized
in particular to detect chemical agents like mustard gas, soman, sarin etc.
To find the best geometry and materials to build the sensor we have per-
formed Monte Carlo simulations using the MCNP software. The first pre-
liminary results show that despite large environmental noise from the water
and sand on the bottom of the sea we are able to detect the signature of the
hidden mustard gas. According to the simulations, the characteristic lines
of chlorine are well visible at low energies, while carbon and sulfur are over-
whelmed by background. It turns out that the energy resolution of NaI(Tl)
detector is to poor to give satisfactory results. Thus, the best material to
replace semiconductor detector qualified to be LaBr3(Ce) providing not only
good energy and time resolutions, but also reasonable detection efficiency.
Analysis of the arrival time distribution of measured gamma quanta shows
that even rough time gating gives very promising results. For prompt pho-
tons we are able to measure the sulfur and chlorine lines originating from
the mustard gas. Unfortuntely, the 4.5 MeV line of Si overlap with carbon
line around 4.4 MeV. The delayed gamma quanta spectrum shows excellent
selectivity of many Cl lines (1.16, 7.42, 7.80 and 8.58 MeV). Altogether, we
are sensitive to at least two elements of mustard gas which may provide sto-
ichiometry identification. As it was mentioned before, the noise originating
from the environment can be significantly reduced by the requirement of
the coincident detection of the alpha particles which are produced together
with neutrons [11]. The α particle detection and its registration time mea-
surement will be included as the next step in the simulations. This will
allow for a final design of the SABAT sensor.
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